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DID MULTICULTURAL AMERICA
RESULT FROM A MISTAKE? THE 1965
IMMIGRATION ACT AND EVIDENCE
FROM ROLL CALL VOTES
Gabriel J. Chin*
Douglas M. Spencer**
Between July 1964 and October 1965, Congress enacted the
three most important civil rights laws since Reconstruction: The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965. As we ap-
proach the 50th anniversary of these laws, it is clear that all three have
fundamentally remade the United States; education, employment,
housing, politics, and the population itself have irreversibly changed.
Arguably the least celebrated yet most consequential of these
laws was the 1965 Immigration Act, which set the United States on the
path to become a "majority minority" nation. In 1960, because U.S.
law restricted immigration by race, eighty-five percent of the popula-
tion was non-Hispanic white. Since the enactment of the Immigration
Act, the Hispanic and Asian American share of the population has
more than quintupled, and by 2043 the Census Bureau projects that
African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans together will
comprise a majority of the population.
Based on the legislative history, statements by government offi-
cials, and media reports, many scholars argue that Congress did not
intend to change the racial demographics of the immigrant stream. In-
stead, these scholars argue that the diversification of the U.S. popula-
tion was an enormous unintended consequence, one which Congress,
had it appreciated what it was doing, might have thought better of
This Article introduces novel evidence to evaluate that claim: the roll
call votes of the House and Senate on these laws. The votes show that
nearly identical coalitions of civil rights advocates supported all three
laws while the same group of racially intolerant legislators opposed
all three. This pattern suggests that all three laws had similar motiva-
tions and goals. We argue that the laws were inspired by sincere anti-
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
** Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Connecticut. Replication mate-
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a remarkable span of fifteen months between July 1964 and
October 1965, Congress passed and President Lyndon B. Johnson signed
three landmark civil rights bills: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("CRA"),1
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"), 2 and the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA") Amendments of 1965.3 These laws unquestion-
ably marked a turning point in American history and dramatically
changed American society.
Of the three, the last may be the least celebrated and the most con-
sequential.4 Half a century after the CRA, African Americans still expe-
rience dramatic disparities in wealth, income, education, employment,
and access to health care as compared to whites.' The VRA revolution-
ized access to the ballot in many parts of the United States, but racial
disparities persist in voter registration and participation.6 The Supreme
Court has invalidated one critical provision of the VRA7 and expressed
doubts about another.8 The Act also has been partially outflanked by
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (1964).
2. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (1965).
3. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
4. Cf Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, 'Effects-Based' Civil Rights Law: Comparing U.S.
Voting Rights, Equal Employment Opportunity and Fair Housing Legislation 15-22 (Nov. 2, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review) (discussing relative suc-
cesses of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of
1968).
5. See, e.g., ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECON. POL'Y INST., THE UNFINISHED MARCH: AN OVERVIEW
10-11 (2013); PEw RES. CR., KING'S DREAM REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL; MANY AMERICANS SEE
RACIAL DISPARITIES 3 (2013), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/08/finalfull-
reportraciaLdisparities.pdf.
6. See, e.g., THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE-VOTING
RATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT ELECTIONS) 4 (2013), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf.
7. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial
Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA "Preclearance" After Shelby County, 102 CAL. L.
REV. 1123 (2014) (discussing Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), invalidating § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, which required some jurisdictions with histories of voting discrimination to pre-
clear changes to election procedures).
8. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional
Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 379-80 (2012) (discussing constitutional
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creative methods and techniques that effectively suppress the vote of
African Americans and other minorities without technically violating its
terms.'
By contrast, the INA completely succeeded in bringing race neutral-
ity to the immigration stream. Before 1965, the vast majority of immi-
grants were Caucasians from Europe.10 As a result, the U.S. population in
1960 was eighty-five percent non-Hispanic white and eleven percent the
descendants of enslaved Africans." The almost total absence of immi-
grants of color was no accident; the United States had a Jim Crow immi-
gration policy pursuant to which limiting immigration of nonpreferred
races was perhaps the single most important goal.12
Under the National Origins Quota System, in effect until 1965, visas
were allocated preferentially to Northern and Western European coun-
tries." Because of their Jewish and Catholic populations, the countries of
Southern and Eastern Europe were given fewer visas. 4 African immigra-
tion was restricted and discouraged." Beginning with the Chinese
Exclusion Act, immigration of those of Asian racial ancestry was almost
entirely prohibited.'" In addition, from 1790 to 1952, Congress restrlicted
the privilege of naturalization by race. 7
challenges to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act in the Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 127
(2010).
9. See, e.g., SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER
SUPPRESSION 14 (2006). See generally Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed Is a Vote Denied: A Preemp-
tive Approach to Eliminating Election Administration Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted Vot-
ers, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 57 (2008); Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identi-
fication Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023 (2009); Janai S. Nelson, The
Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579 (2013); Spencer Overton, Voter Identifi-
cation, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631 (2007); Terry Smith, Disappearing Districts: Minority Vote Dilution
Doctrine as Politics, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1680 (2009); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where
Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006).
10. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS., 2011 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRA-
TION STATISTICS, 6 tbl.2 [hereinafter 2011 YEARBOOK], available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/immigration-statisticslyearbook/2011/ois yb 2011.pdf.
I1. Paul Taylor & D'Vera Cohn, A Milestone En Route to a Majority Minority Nation, PEw RES.:
Soc. & DEV. TRENDS (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/11/07/a-milestone-en-route-
to-a-majority-minority-nation/.
12. See generally ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 (2004); BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH
IMMIGRATION POLICY (2004); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION
AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004). Indeed, in 1790, the first Congress passed, and President George Washing-
ton signed, a law restricting naturalization to "free white persons." Naturalization Act, ch. 3, § 1, 1
Stat. 103, 103-04 (1790) (repealed in 1790). In 1922, the Supreme Court unanimously called the racial
restriction "a rule in force from the beginning of the government, a part of our history as well as our
law, welded into the structure of our national polity by a century of legislative and administrative acts
and judicial decisions . .. ." Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922).
13. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279 (1996).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 280 n.21 (citing generally Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion
to African Americans, 37 How. L.J. 237 (1994)).
16. Id. at 280-82.
17. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 1 (N.Y.U. Press
2006).
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Since 1965, the vast majority of immigrants have been from the
Third World, particularly Latin America, South America, and Asia.'"
This is not the result of immigration "affirmative action" or ra-
cial/national preferences aimed at new populations or nations. Instead,
immigrants are admitted based on job skills or connections to U.S. citi-
zens or lawful permanent residents-so-called "green card" holders.19 As
of 2012, only sixty-three percent of the U.S. population is non-Hispanic
white. 20 In California, Hawaii, New Mexico, Texas, and the District of
Columbia, the minority population exceeded the white population as of
2012, and the Census Bureau projects that United States as a whole will
become a "majority minority" nation by 2043.21
Many scholars contend that neither Congress nor the
Administration welcomed or anticipated the demographic shift in the
immigrant stream. Eithne Luibheid contended that the "surge [of Asians
and other non-whites] was clearly an unintended consequence of the
1965 act and did not occur because lawmakers set out to right a wrong. "22
Nor was the 1965 abolition of explicit preferences "ever intended to ac-
complish more than a primarily cosmetic change, one that would not ac-
tually open the United States to significant Asian, Latin American,
African or Caribbean migration."2 Therefore, "passage of the 1965 INA
did not represent a complete rupture with the long history of exercising
racial and ethnic control through immigration." 24
Mae Ngai suggested that liberals in Congress believed that "opening
Asiatic immigration in principle would not mean opening it in practice, at
least not significantly."2 5 Hugh Davis Graham explained that officials be-
lieved that "far from threatening to ethnically transform the nation, the
immigration reform bill would, as a practical matter, produce a national
origins system of immigration, but without the offensive quotas." 26 Erika
Lee concluded:
The 1965 Act abolished the national origins quotas, but lawmakers
still expressed a desire to facilitate immigration from Europe, and
to limit-or at the very least, discourage-immigration from Asia,
Latin America and Africa. Indeed, although a racial hierarchy was
18. 2011 YEARBOOK, supra note 10, at 8-11.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
20. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Projections Show a Slower Grow-
ing, Older, More Diverse Nation a Half Century from Now (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.census.gov/
newsroom/releases/archives/population/cbl2-243.html.
21. Id.
22. Eithne Luibheid, The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act: An "End" to Exclusion?, 5
POSITIONS no. 2, 501, 507 (1997).
23. Id. at 510.
24. Id.
25. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 246 (2004).
26. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA 61 (2002).
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not explicitly written into the law as in 1924, it remained deeply
embedded in the 1965 act's design and intent. 27
Theodore H. White called the Immigration Act "noble, revolution-
ary-and probably the most thoughtless of the many acts of the Great
Society.""
The claim is not merely that details of the Act's operation were un-
known. Rather, it is that the effective preference for whites was a condi-
tion of enactment. David Reimers questions what "[Congress] would
have done if this issue were clear in 1965,"29 suggesting the possibility
that the bill would not have passed, at least not without measures de-
signed to minimize Asian and other non-white immigration."o Roger
Daniels has no doubts: "[H]ad the Congress fully understood [the 1965
Act's] consequences, it almost certainly would not have passed."3 ' Immi-
gration restrictionists rely on the unanticipated consequences of the Act
as a reason to repeal it. 3 2
What, then, was the Immigration Act if not an attempt to integrate
the immigration stream? Some scholars point to the foreign policy impli-
cations of the Act and the benefit of being "seen as the egalitarian cham-
pion of the 'free world.' 3 How could Congress pass progressive domes-
tic civil rights legislation and simultaneously maintain an immigration
policy which operated with a racially discriminatory effect? Under this
interpretation, the Immigration Act was less about racial integration and
more a foreign policy fig leaf.
Others, including one of the authors," have disagreed with these
scholars.35 They argue that statements in the legislative history and con-
27. Erika Lee, A Nation of Immigrants and a Gatekeeping Nation: American Immigration Law
and Policy, in A COMPANION To AMERICAN IMMIGRATION (Reed Ueda ed., 2006).
28. THEODORE H. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT,
1956-1980, at 363 (1982).
29. DAVID M. REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN DOOR: THE THIRD WORLD COMES To AMERICA
76 (2d ed. 1992).
30. Professor Reimers concluded: "The bill might have passed anyway, in the civil rights and
generally liberal climate of 1965, but perhaps not so easily or without other changes." Id.
31. ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY IN
AMERICAN LIFE 338 (1990).
32. See, e.g., LAWRENCE AUSTER, THE PATH TO NATIONAL SUICIDE: AN ESSAY ON
IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM 10-26 (1990) (arguing that consequences of 1965 Act were
unintended); S.L. Bachman, As the Number of People Increases in Poor Nations, the Number of People
at the Borders of Rich Countries Does, Too. The Human Tide Comes In, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Mar. 20, 1994, at 7C ("The Law of Unintended Consequences upsets planning."); Otis Graham, Jr.,
Tracing Liberal Woes to '65 Immigration Act, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 28, 1995, at 19, available
at http://cis.org/Liberalism%252665ImmigrationAct.
33. BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION
POLICY, 1850-1990, at 79 (1993); see also, e.g., NGAI, supra note 25, at 263 (noting that proponents of
reform "leveraged Cold War foreign policy interests").
34. See Chin, supra note 13, at 300.
35. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 4 (reprint ed. 1975) ("The passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 marked the disap-
pearance from Federal law of crucial distinctions on the basis of race and national origin. The nation
agreed with this act that there would be no effort to control the future ethnic and racial character of
the American population and rejected the claim that some racial and ethnic groups were more suited
to be Americans than others.").
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temporary media accounts make clear that the Immigration Act was a
genuine effort to eliminate the ugly history of racism from U.S. immigra-
tion law.36
It is important to understand the significance of the claim that the
1965 Immigration Act was a Cold War gesture not actually intended to
eliminate racism root and branch. Immigration reform's centrality to the
liberal project is exemplified by President John F. Kennedy's book A
Nation of Immigrants, published posthumously in 1964 with an introduc-
tion written by Robert F. Kennedy.37 Offering an understanding of race
which modern progressives might well embrace, it includes illustra-
tions-and thus implicit comparisons-of Ku Klux Klan rallies, Nazi
book burnings, and a nineteenth century anti-Chinese riot in Denver.38
The President's book calls the Japanese American internment "unrea-
soning discrimination" and notes that "[t]he same things are said today
of Puerto Ricans and Mexicans that were once said of Irish, Italians,
Germans, and Jews: 'They'll never adjust; they can't learn the language;
they won't be absorbed."'" 9 Although not particularly academic, the book
is remarkable, perhaps unique, because it was written by a sitting Presi-
dent who made and defended very specific policy reforms that ultimately
became law.40 The central idea was that U.S. law "should be modified" so
that it admitted "those with the greatest ability to add to the national
welfare, no matter where they are born." 41 Of course, this nice language
is perfectly consistent with the argument that no change was intended.
Perhaps legislative antiracism was situational. For example, Presidents
Kennedy, Johnson, and Congress might have understood immigration
and domestic civil rights differently. Conceivably, they recognized that it
had to offer fair treatment to African Americans who were already in the
United States, but discriminating against Asians, Latinos, and Africans in
foreign lands on the basis of their race was practically and morally differ-
ent.
If the Immigration Act's race neutrality was hypocritical, there are
potentially even more fundamental implications. At the moment, there
seems to be little question among academics or the courts that the VRA42
and CRA were intended to achieve actual equal opportunity.43 But if the
36. See, e.g., id. at 3; see also, e.g., Chin, supra note 13, at 300-01.
37. JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS, at ix-xi (rev. ed. 1964).
38. Id. at 71-76.
39. Id. at 63.
40. Id. at 77-83 (outlining proposal); see also id. at 102 (reprinting President Kennedy's July 23,
1963, address on immigration).
41. Id. at 103.
42. "Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for the broad remedial purpose of
'rid[ding] the country of racial discrimination in voting."' Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991)
(quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)); see also Laughlin McDonald, Hold-
er v. Hall- Blinking at Minority Voting Rights, 3 D.C. L. REv. 61,75 (1995).
43. "The primary purpose of Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] was 'to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have
fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."' Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
[Vol. 20151244
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Immigration Act was disguised Jim Crow legislation, that fact impeaches
the "Second Reconstruction" as an enterprise. If Congress and the
Administration intended the Immigration Act to result in no real change,
perhaps the VRA and CRA were also intended to maintain a segregated
status quo in more polite form.
This Article tests the claim that the 1965 Immigration Act did not
intend to accomplish real reform. In Part II, we begin by briefly tracing
the legislative history of the CRA, the VRA, and the INA. We note that
President Johnson promoted moral ideals such as equality and fairness in
justifying and promoting all three laws to the public. In Part III, we then
present a new body of evidence based on Congressional roll call votes
that challenges the claim that the Immigration Act had different motiva-
tions and expectations than the CRA and VRA. Specifically, we identify
striking patterns of overlapping support and opposition for all three bills.
In every case, nearly identical coalitions of civil rights advocates support-
ed the bills while the same group of racially intolerant legislators op-
posed them." At the same time, support for the Immigration Act shows
no correlation with foreign policy bills. 45 We interpret these patterns as
compelling evidence that all three laws had similar goals. To the extent
that the three laws were passed with the same motivation, we argue that
the most likely motivation was sincere antiracism and not cosmetic legis-
lation intended to have little practical effect.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Exactly five months before he was assassinated, President Kennedy
federalized the Alabama National Guard to usher two black students in-
to the University of Alabama. 46 That same evening, Kennedy addressed
the nation from the Oval Office and exhorted the country to examine
their conscience with respect to racial equality:
We face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and as a peo-
ple .... It is time to act in the Congress, in your State and local leg-
islative body and, above all, in all of the daily lives .... Next week I
shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a com-
mitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that
race has no place in American life or law. 4 7
U.S. 792, 800 (1973)); see also, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American An-
tidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (examining judicial interpretations of Title VII).
44. See infra Part III.B.
45. See infra Part III.A.
46. For a detailed history of the events in Alabama, see E. CULPEPPER CLARK, THE
SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR: SEGREGATION'S LAST STAND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA (1993) and
GERALD N. ROSENBURG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (Ben-
jamin L. Page 2d ed., 1991).
47. Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, PUB. PAPERS: JOHN F.
KENNEDY, 1963, at 468 (June 11, 1963), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4730928.
1963.001/521?view=pdf.
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Kennedy did not live long enough to shepherd his proposed act
through Congress. That task fell to Lyndon B. Johnson. Addressing a
joint session of Congress in the wake of Kennedy's assassination,
Johnson made his appeal:
First, no memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor
President Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of
the civil rights bill for which he fought so long. We have talked long
enough in this country about equal rights. We have talked for 100
years or more. It is time now to write the next chapter-and to
write it in the books of law."
Within six weeks, the House of Representatives approved a new
Civil Rights Act and sent it to the Senate.49 After a record sixty days of
debate and a filibuster, 0 the Senate enacted a revised version that was
approved by the House on July 2, 1964, and signed by President Johnson
the same day."
Nine months later, on March 7, 1965, approximately 600 civil rights
demonstrators began to march from Selma, Alabama toward the state
capitol in Montgomery, fifty-four miles away, where they sought the
Governor's protection of their voting rights, among other things.5 2 Less
than a mile into their journey, the marchers were violently attacked by
police officers with tear gas and batons. 3 Photographs of the confronta-
tion were broadcast on television and printed in newspapers across the
country.' In an instant, this local conflict became a national story and
prompted President Johnson to convene a joint session of Congress eight
days later." In his remarks, President Johnson referenced the brutal as-
sault in Selma and urged Congress to pass a Voting Rights Act:
We cannot, we must not, refuse to protect the right of every
American to vote in every election that he may desire to participate
in. And we ought not and cannot and we must not wait another 8
months before we get a bill. We have already waited a hundred
years and more, and the time for waiting is gone. So I ask you to
48. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1963-
1964, at 8, 9 (Nov. 27, 1963), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edulp/ppotpus/4730949.1964.001/
90?view=image&size=100.
49. See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT (1985).
50. See id.; 110 CONG. REC. 13,327 (1964) (detailing Roll Call No. 281, regarding a motion to
invoke cloture).
51. 110 CONG. REC. 14,511 (1964) (regarding Roll Call No. 436, the Senate's roll call vote for the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); 110 CONG. REC. 15,897 (1964) (concerning Roll Call No. 179, the House's
roll call vote on the Senate's version of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
52. Selma-to-Montgomery March, NPS.Gov, http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/civilrights/al4.htm
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join me in working long hours-nights and weekends, if necessary-
to pass this bill. 6
The Senate immediately drafted a bill that survived twenty-eight
roll call votes and a filibuster before being sent to the House." By
August, the House had approved a bill, and a conference version was
adopted and signed by President Johnson on August 6, 1965.11
Congress built on its momentum by considering a proposal to re-
form the Immigration and Nationality Act on August 25, 1965."9 Within
two weeks, President Johnson stood at the foot of the Statute of Liberty
to sign the new immigration law. Addressing the nation, President
Johnson pointed to the new law's emphasis on fairness:
This is a simple test, and it is a fair test. Those who can contribute
most to this country-to its growth, to its strength, to its spirit-will
be the first that are admitted to this land. The fairness of this stand-
ard is so self-evident that we may well wonder that it has not always
been applied.?
In just fifteen months, Congress had passed three historic civil rights
bills. In Part III, we turn our attention to the members of Congress who
voted for these three laws and ask, to what extent did support for the
CRA and the VRA overlap support for the INA?
III. ANALYSIS OF ROLL CALL VOTES
A. Vote Totals and Overlapping Support
If our hypothesis is correct that the INA was an intentional civil
rights law, then we should observe a correlation between the coalitions in
Congress that supported each of these bills. To the extent that these
three laws were motivated by similar considerations, similar groups of
legislators likely supported all three. If the INA was primarily motivated
by racial equality, then we would expect the same members of Congress
that voted for the CRA and VRA to also have voted for the INA. If the
INA was simply a symbolic gesture of foreign policy aimed at repairing
America's image overseas, then its supporting coalition is likely to be
somewhat different than coalitions supporting the CRA and VRA.
We acknowledge at the outset two important limitations to any em-
pirical analysis of roll call votes. First, roll call votes represent the end
56. Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise, 1 PUB. PAPERS: LYNDON B.
JOHNSON, 1965, at 281, 283-84 (Mar. 15, 1965), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edulp/ppotpus/4730
960.1965.001/357?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=100;view=image.
57. August 4, 1965: The Senate Passes the Voting Rights Act, U.S. SENATE, https://www.
senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Senate PassesVoting-Rights-Act.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2015).
58. Id.
59. See An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
60. Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York 2 PUB. PAPERS:
LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965, at 1037-38 (Oct. 3, 1965), available at http://quod.1ib.umich.edup/p
potpus/4730960.1965.002/509?rgn=full+text;view=image.
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product of a complex and strategic process. Some of the most important
decisions about a bill are made during the legislative drafting process, the
agenda setting protocol, and in back rooms where legislators trade votes
and negotiate compromises. 61 Roll call votes do not capture these im-
portant events and therefore ignore crucial signals about the positions
and priorities of legislators. Second, roll call votes represent a formal tal-
ly of a legislator's position but do not reveal anything about the legisla-
tor's intent. As a result, we cannot distinguish between genuine, symbol-
ic, or strategic votes, but assume that all votes represent the true
preferences of the legislator.
Because of these limitations, we employ a mixed-method approach.
We begin with an analysis of roll call votes that includes votes at differ-
ent stages in the legislative process. By measuring votes for different ver-
sions of the bill, we can observe whether coalitions changed under differ-
ent circumstances. We also estimate a scaled measure of ideology based
on hundreds of roll call votes by each member of Congress. By pooling
roll call votes, we more accurately capture the true position of each legis-
lator and can therefore test whether our findings are driven by strategic
votes or genuine preferences. All of our analyses utilize data from Keith
Poole and Howard Rosenthal's Voteview project that has coded all roll
call votes for every Congress in U.S. history.62
61. See, e.g., GARY W. Cox & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 (2005); DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 3 (1991) (describing the
conditions under which legislative ambiguity is a rational choice for lawmakers); ANN SEIDMAN ET
AL., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR DRAFTERS 5 (2001) (describing
the inextricable link between a bill's form and its substance); MAXWELL J. STEARNS & TODD J.
ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 94, 105-07 (2009); Jack L. Walker,
Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection, 7 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 423, 427
(1977).
62. Keith Poole et al., Roll Call Data, VOTEVIEW, http://voteview.com/downloads.asp#
PARTYSPLITSDWNL (last visited Feb 8,2015).
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TABLE 1. OVERVIEW OF ROLL CALL VOTES
(A) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Democrats Republicans TOTAL
Yea Nay Yea Nay Yea Nay
Civil Rights Act (1964) 152 6 138 4 290
Senate version 153 91 136 35 289 126
Voting Rights Act (1965) 221 62 112 23 333
Conference version 218 54 110 20 328 4
Imm. & Nat'lity Act (1965) 209 71 109 4 318
Senate version 202 60 118 1 320
(B) SENATE
Democrats Republicans TOTAL
Yea \"aI Yea N\y Yea
Civil Rights Act (1964) 41 1 7 26 67
Cloture vote 45 23 27 71 2
Adopt substitute for HR 7152 46 18 30 76
Final version 46 21 27 73
Voting Rights Act (1965) 47 17 31 78
Cloture vote 47 1 23 70 30
Conference version 49 17 30 1 79 1
Imm. & Nat'lity Act (1965) 52 15 24 3 76
In Table 1, we present the overall vote totals for the CRA, VRA,
and INA in both legislative chambers. There were very few roll call votes
in the House of Representatives for any of the bills. There are exactly
three recorded roll call votes in the House on the CRA (H.R. 7152). The
first vote is a motion on Saturday postponing consideration of the bill un-
til the following Monday, the second vote supports passage of the bill,
and the third vote adopts the Senate's version of the bill.63
The VRA (H.R. 6400) attracted four amendments, only one of
which was adopted,64 in addition to votes on initial passage and the con-
63. See Keith Poole et al., 88th House Codebook, VOTEVIEW, ftp://voteview.com/dtl/88.dtl (last
visited Feb. 8,2015).
64. The successful amendment established criminal penalties against anyone giving false infor-
mation on their voter registration application. The three failed amendments addressed illiterate voters,
judicial review of the Act, and poll taxes.
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ference version.65 The INA (H.R. 2580) saw one failed amendment,6 one
vote on initial passage, and one vote adopting the conference version.6 1
The Senate was much more active in debating these bills. The CRA
commanded the Senate's attention longer than any other bill in its histo-
ry,' was subject to one of the longest filibusters in history,69 and generat-
ed 108 roll call votes on various motions and amendments."o The VRA
was also filibustered in the Senate and saw twenty-nine roll call votes."
Meanwhile, the INA sailed through with a single vote.7 2
We note two patterns in the data presented in Table 1. First, the
CRA, VRA, and INA were all enacted with wide majorities of both par-
ties in both chambers of Congress. Second, the vote totals and voting co-
alitions are nearly identical between early passage and final passage of
each bill, with approximately sixty to seventy percent support across the
board. Two deviations are worthy of attention, both from roll calls in the
Senate. First, six Republicans voted against cloture and against final pas-
sage of the CRA but voted in favor of the bill at other stages.73 Second,
ten Republicans voted against cloture for the VRA but then supported
its final passage.74 We explore these deviations in more detail below.
The overall similarity in numbers between the different versions of
the bills suggests that there were few members of Congress that support-
ed the bills in theory but not in practice. Regardless, strong support for
all three laws does not speak directly to our hypothesis, which is that the
underlying coalitions, not just the overall numbers, in support of the bills
are similar.
65. See Keith Poole et al., 89th House Codebook, VOTEVIEW, ftp://voteview.com/dtl/89.dtl (last
visited Feb. 8, 2015).
66. The failed amendment would have created a quota of 115,000 immigrations per year from
countries in the Western hemisphere.
67. See supra note 64.
68. See supra note 56.
69. Associated Press, The Longest U.S. Senate Filibusters, AP: THE BIG STORY (Sept. 25, 2013,
12:47 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/longest-us-senate-filibusters.
70. See Keith Poole et al., 88th Senate Codebook, VOTEVIEW, ftp://voteview.com/dtl/88s.dtl (last
visited Feb. 8, 2015).
71. See Keith Poole et al., 89th Senate Codebook, VOTEVIEW, ftp://voteview.com/dtl/89s.dtl (last
visited Feb. 8, 2015).
72. Id.
73. See Major Features of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, DIRKSEN CENTER, http://www.dirksen
center.org/print-basics.histmats-civilrights64text.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
74. See infra note 98.
75. See infra note 98.
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TABLE 2. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS THAT VOTED FOR MORE THAN
(A) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE BILL
(1) (la) (2) (3)
CRA (adj) VRA INA
CRA 289 239 -- --
Number of
VRA 221 221 328 --
yea votes
INA 207 207 283 320
CRA 100 100 -- --
Percent VRA 76.5 92.5 100 --
INA 71.6 86.6 86.3 100
(B) SENATE
CRA (adj) VRA INA
CRA 73 68
Number of yea votes VRA 66 66 77
INA 62 62 72 76
CRA 100 100
Percent VRA 90.4 97.1 100
INA 84.9 91.2 93.5 100
In Table 2, we show how many members of Congress voted in favor
of more than one bill.7 1 We observe that members of Congress who voted
for the CRA were slightly more likely to support the VRA than the INA.
But we note that a high percentage of senators and representatives voted
for at least two of the laws. Such strong correlations are particularly no-
table because there was an intervening midterm election between the
CRA and the other two Acts." Among supporters of the CRA, fifty
members of the House and five members of the Senate were no longer in
Congress in 1965.8 Thus, the correlations in column (1) between legisla-
tors voting for the CRA and at least one of the other two bills is biased
downwards. In reality, the baseline of possible overlapping CRA sup-
porters was only 239 in the House (not 289) and sixty-eight in the Senate
(not seventy-three). Against this adjusted baseline, the percent of over-
lapping support between the CRA and VRA grows to 92.5% in the
House and 97.1% in the Senate.79 The percent of overlapping support be-
tween the CRA and INA grows to 86.6% in the House and 91.2% in the
Senate. These higher (and more accurate) numbers mirror the correla-
76. Vote totals reflect the roll call on final passage for each Act.
77. See STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 3,
1964, available at http://clerk.house.gov/member-info/electionlnfo/1964election.pdf.
78. See supra Table 2, at column 1, 1(a).
79. See supra Table 2, at column 1(a).
No. 3] 1251
(1) (la) (2) (3)
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
tion between yea votes for the VRA and INA. Nearly ninety percent of
the yea votes for the INA were by members of Congress that had sup-
ported the VRA just one month earlier. In all, 196 members of the
House and sixty-one senators supported all three bills. 0
As a point of comparison, we look at the correlation between votes
for the INA and votes for the only other foreign policy bills that were
enacted during the 89th Congress: the Foreign Assistance Act" and the
Foreign Investors Tax Act.82 The Foreign Assistance Act was a targeted
grant of foreign aid aimed at promoting agricultural production and
health in developing countries.83 The Foreign Investors Tax Act was
Congress' response to a Presidential task force charged with promoting
increased foreign investment in U.S. corporations operating abroad.8 To
the extent that the INA was passed to improve the U.S. relationship with
the world, we might expect support for the INA to correlate strongly
with support for these two foreign policy bills explicitly aimed at enhanc-
ing the country's image abroad. As it turns out, the members of Congress
supporting the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Investors Tax
Act were not strong supporters of the INA. Fifty-six percent of the
INA's supporters in the House voted for the Foreign Assistance Act, and
forty-two percent voted for the Foreign Investors Tax Act." In the
Senate, the overlap was just thirty-seven percent and twenty-nine per-
cent, for each bill respectively. Contrast these numbers to the overlap-
ping support with the VRA and the CRA (seventy to ninety percent) in
Table 2.
To better gauge the relative strength of voting coalitions between
these bills, we rank every roll call vote in the House and Senate during
80. See supra Table 2.
81. Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-583,80 Stat. 795-3 (1966).
82. Foreign Investors Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966). With the exception of
several general appropriations bills for the military and foreign aid, Congress did not consider any
other foreign policy bills. The Senate debated and rejected a county-by-country quota amendment to
the Sugar Act. The House passed amendments to the Foreign Service Buildings Act (limiting competi-
tion for construction or repair of American owned buildings abroad), but the Senate did not schedule
a vote. Both Houses approved an amendment to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, but the
amendment was not a foreign policy measure as it merely provided additional time for the payment of
income taxes by those who under-withheld their 1964 wages. See supra notes 65 and 71.
83. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151(a) (2012) ("[T]he Congress declares that a principal objective of the
foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and sustained support of the people of devel-
oping countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to development and
to build the economic, political, and social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives.").
84. S. REP. No. 89-1707, at 9 (1966), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/library/
reports/committee/download/?id=4ee7ee42-2874-4976-8161-00919c85e474 ("On October 2, 1963, the
President appointed a task force on 'Promoting Increased Foreign Investment in U.S. Corporate Secu-
rities and Increased Foreign Financing for U.S. Corporations Operating Abroad.' On April 27, 1964, a
report of this task force was released. Among the recommendations of the task force were a series of
proposals designed to modify the U.S. taxation of foreign investors.").
85. Compare To Pass H.R. 15750, The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, GOvTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/89-1966/h285 (last visited Feb. 8,2015), and To Adopt the Con-
ference Report on H.R. 13013, The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, GOvTRACK, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/89-1966/h392 (last visited Feb. 8, 2015), with To Pass H.R. 2580, The
Amended Immigration and Nationality Act, GovTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/89-
1965/h125 (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
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the 89th Congress by its percent of overlapping support for final passage
of the INA. 6 In order to generate a meaningful comparison of roll call
votes, we drop several votes from our analysis where there was little or
no opposition. A measure of overlapping support is meaningless for
unanimous votes (where all votes overlap!) and also for votes where only
a few legislators dissent.
We follow the convention to drop all votes where the "nays" do not
exceed 2.5% of the overall vote total (about ten members of the House
and two members of the Senate)Y Of the 394 roll call votes in the House,
we drop forty-five unanimous votes and forty-seven votes where less
than 2.5% of the votes are nays.8 Of the 499 roll call votes in the Senate,
we drop forty-five unanimous votes and thirteen votes where two or few-
er senators dissented. 9 The results are striking. In both the House and
the Senate, the roll call vote that most strongly overlaps with the INA is
related to the VRA. Of the nine roll call votes in the House most similar
to the INA, one is for an amendment to the CRA, two are for the VRA,
and one is for an amendment to the INA." In the Senate, four of the six
roll call votes with the most overlapping support for the INA are related
to the VRA, including adoption of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute
(which turned out to be the final version), the cloture vote, and passage. 91
86. See infra Figure 1.
87. See generally KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-
ECONoMic HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Keith Poole et al., Scaling Roll Call Votes with
wnorninate in R, 42 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1 (2011) (where the default value for the 'lop' argument is
0.025).
88. Our findings are not driven by the decision to drop unanimous and near-unanimous votes,
even though these votes (by definition) have very high rates of overlap. For example, of the 394 roll
call votes in the House, the INA was more similar to the Voting Rights Act than to 360 (or 91.4%) of
all bills. By comparison, the Foreign Assistance Act was the 228th most similar bill (42.1%) and the
Foreign Investors Tax Act was the 300th most similar (23.9%).
89. When all Senate roll call votes are included, the Voting Rights Act is the second most similar
bill to the INA, more similar than 99.6% of all Senate roll call votes. By comparison, the Foreign
Assistance Act was the 267th most similar bill (46.2%) and the Foreign Investors Tax Act was the
348th most similar (29.8%).
90. The other five bills addressed Presidential succession, NASA appropriations, the appoint-
ment of federal judges, Department of Interior appropriations, and unemployment insurance.
91. The other two bills addressed military appropriations and an excise tax reduction, which
were opposed by five and three senators, respectively.
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FIGURE 1. ROLL CALL VOTES IN THE 89TH CONGRESS, RANKED BY
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Contrast this relationship with the VRA to the lack of overlapping
support for the two foreign policy bills. Support for the Foreign
Assistance Act was less similar to support for the INA than nearly half of
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all roll call votes (46.2% in the House and 47.2% in the Senate). Over-
lapping support for the INA and the Foreign Investors Tax Act was even
weaker. Only one-third of all roll call votes were less similar.2 We inter-
pret these findings to be compelling evidence that members of Congress
who favored the INA were those who had supported the two racial
equality laws of the mid-1960s. In Part III.B, we analyze the ideology of
legislative supporters and opponents of these laws to identify whether
the strong correlations we present above represent coalitions of like-
minded civil rights advocates or something else.
B. Ideal Points and Coalitional Voting
In our final analysis, we use ideal point estimation to confirm that
the supporting coalitions of the CRA, VRA, and INA were actual ideo-
logical associates and not mere coincidental allies. Ideal point estimation
is a technique that pools together roll call votes and legislators over mul-
tiple issues, and sometimes over multiple years.3 Because voting data is
pooled, legislators are characterized by their patterns of voting over time
instead of by any one vote, which may be genuine, symbolic, or strate-
gic.9 4 Because legislators are pooled, ideal points measure the ideological
position of members of Congress relative to each other.
In the simplest model, ideal points represent political preferences
on a left-right scale. The model assumes that legislators vote in favor of
motions or bills that move public policy closer to the legislator's most
preferred outcome. This is a contestable assumption for any particular
vote, but in the aggregate, the assumption reflects a rational choice theo-
ry of legislative voting. In more complicated models (which we use here),
ideal points are estimated in two dimensions. The first dimension repre-
sents the conventional left-right divide along political and economic is-
sues. The second dimension picks up variation in voting patterns with re-
spect to racial politics. In early Congresses (pre-1870), the second
dimension detects legislative conflicts over slavery, and throughout much
of the 1900s, it picked up on conflicts about civil rights, particularly for
African Americans. 9 5
In Figure 2, we plot the ideal points of every legislator during the
88th and 89th Congresses (1963-1967).9 Each data point represents one
92. The Foreign Assistance Act was more similar than just 32.1% of all roll call votes in the
House and 34.7% of all roll call votes in the Senate.
93. See Poole et al., supra note 87, at 1-2.
94. Ideological preferences based on multiple measures are more reliable than preferences based
on a single question, or small set of questions. See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Strength of Issues:
Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting, 102
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 215, 217-19 (2008) (comparing unstable preferences among survey respondents
that answer a single question relative to respondents that answer several related questions).
95. See generally NOLAN M. MCCARTY ET AL., INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND THE
REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1997); KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY
& CONGRESS (2007).
96. The ideal points are generated using DW-NOMINATE. See Royce Carroll et al., Measuring
Bias and Uncertainty in DW-NOMINA TE Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap, 17 POL.
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legislator displayed in a "common space." The x-axis measures the first
dimension ideal point and, as the plot illustrates, there is a clear separa-
tion between Democrats (further to the left) and Republicans (further to
the right). The y-axis measures the second dimension ideal point and
shows clear patterns in voting coalitions for the CRA and the VRA. The
least racially tolerant Democrats and Republicans -those with the most
positive ideal points on the second dimension-were the most likely to
vote against the two most expansive civil rights laws. Eighty-one percent
of legislators with ideal points greater than 0.5 voted against the Civil
Rights Act, compared to just ten percent of all other legislators.7 Seven-
ty-four percent of senators with ideal points greater than 0.5 voted
against the Voting Rights Act, compared to just three percent of all other
legislators. The divide in the House is fifty-six percent to seven percent.98
ANAL. 261 (2009). For estimates for every Congress through 2012, see Royce Carroll et al., DW-
NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors, VOTEVIEw (Feb. 17, 2013),
http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm. There are two general approaches for computing ideal points. The
first method was pioneered by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal in the 1990s. See generally POOLE
& ROSENTHAL, supra note 87. The second approach, developed in the early 2000s by Joshua Clinton,
Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers, uses a Bayesian model. See generally Joshua Clinton et al., The
Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data, 98 AM. POL. Sa. REv. 355 (2004). Both methods produce nearly
identical ideal points for large legislatures (greater than fifty members) and a large number of votes
(greater than thirty). See Royce Carroll et al., Comparing NOMINATE and IDEAL: Points of Differ-
ence and Monte Carlo Tests, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 555, 555 (2009); Joshua D. Clinton & Simon Jackman,
To Simulate or NOMINATE?, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 593, 593 (2009).
97. In the House, 12.9% of legislators with ideal points less than 0.5 voted against the Civil
Rights Act. In the Senate the number is 8.1%.
98. The ideal points also provide some context to explain the behavior of those that voted for
and against the same bills at different points during the process. For example, ten senators voted
against cloture for the Voting Rights Act (i.e., they supported the filibuster) but then ultimately voted
in favor of the Act's passage. The average second-dimension ideal points for these senators (-0.04) is
more positive than the ideal points of senators that supported the bill (-0.07), but not quite as positive
as those that voted against it (0.82). These ideal point estimates provide evidence that senators who
voted differently during the process were in fact voting with genuine intent, rather than strategically.
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FIGURE 2. Two-DIMENSIONAL SCALED MEASURE OF IDEOLOGY
FOR EACH LEGISLATOR IN THE 88TH AND 89TH CONGRESSES
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We draw the reader's attention to the middle panels of Figure 2 that
show similar patterns for the Immigration and Nationality Act. Sixty-one
percent of legislators with ideal points greater than 0.5 voted against the
INA compared to five percent of all other legislators. In other words, the
same racially intolerant Democrats and Republicans that voted against
the CRA and the VRA also voted against the INA. We interpret these
findings as evidence that the voting coalitions for these bills were not
comprised of strategic bedfellows, but instead reflected a concerted ef-
fort at stalling civil rights measures aimed at racial integration, including
the Immigration Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 may be
the most effective and consequential civil rights act of the 1960s. In half a
century, the INA has radically transformed the underlying population of
the United States, with nonwhites likely to outnumber whites within the
next thirty years. Is this multiculturalism the product of a mistake? Was
the law designed to eliminate racism in form, perhaps as a foreign policy
gesture but not eliminate discrimination in practice? We do not think so.
In this Article we have presented evidence that challenges the claim that
members of Congress had a different motivation and expectations for the
INA compared to other civil rights laws. We acknowledge that roll call
votes do not necessarily capture the intent of any particular vote, but
given the ideological makeup of the coalition supporting the INA, we
think the evidence points more strongly toward a Congress that intended
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to end racial discrimination in education, employment, and voting. The
evidence is clear that the same civil rights coalitions that supported the
CRA and VRA also supported the INA. Similarly, legislators opposed to
civil rights opposed all three bills. To the extent that the three laws had
similar goals, we think it is clear that the most likely motivation was sin-
cere anti-racism and not cosmetic legislation intended to have little prac-
tical effect.
